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PRELIMINARY HEARINGS IN HOMICIDE CASES: A HEARING
DELAYED IS A HEARING DENIEDt
WILLIAM H. THEIS*
Although statutory enactments envision a
speedy preliminary hearing for the suspect charged
with a felony, judges generally deprive the homi-
cide suspect of any such hearing. Courts grant the
county prosecutor whatever continuances he
desires until he decides to seek an indictment or
dismiss the police charges. The unfortunate con-
sequence of this practice is that the average homi-
cide suspect, ineligible for bond, waits in jail until
an official determination is made that there is
probable cause to hold him for further prosecution.
This practice imposes on the public the expense of
long incarceration for those who will never come to
trial. In addition, it imposes great personal ex-
pense upon individuals eventually cleared and
released as well as upon those who must anxiously
wait for the finding that there is some basis for
further prosecution.' Thus, the preliminary hearing
area is ripe for beneficial change.
To that end, this comment examines the Illinois
law of preliminary hearings with special attention
to the prosecutor's power to avoid them. It further
presents the results of a field study of the pre-
liminary hearing in homicide cases, which indicates
that the prosecutor does in fact, at great expense to
defendants, freely exercise his power to avoid
them. With this background, possible legal theories
to change the present practice will be explored;
and legislation that might serve as an alternative
to judicial action will be suggested. 2
t The focus of this article concerns proceedings in
Cook County, Illinois. Cook County, however, is not
unlike other large metropolitan areas in its procedures
and problems. The author is grateful for the assistance
of Professor James B. Haddad of the Northwestern
University School of Law.
* A.B., J.D., teaching associate, Northwestern
University School of Law.
'This practice also forecloses one avenue of pretrial
discovery of the prosecutor's case. On the other hand,
whether a preliminary hearing should allow pretrial
discovery remains open to serious question. See, e.g.,
United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 53-54 (7th Cir.
1968). Accordingly, this comment will focus on the
preliminary hearing's obvious, widely acknowledged
goal-the quick investigation of whether the state has
probable cause to detain a man for further prosecution.
See, e.g., 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDE A a PRAcricE AND PRo-
cEnTRE §80, at 135 (1969); Greenberg, The President's
Page, 51 CHI. BAR Rxc. 106, 109-10 (1969).
2 It should be noted at the outset that Congress has
LAw op PRELnINARY -EARiNGS
If the prosecutor holds great power to control
pre-indictment judicial proceedings, he does so
because the law on this segment of the judicial
process is undeveloped. 3 For example, section 109-1
of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure requires
the judge to hold a preliminary hearing for any
defendant whom the police present on a felony
charge.4 At this hearing the judge decides whether
there is probable cause to hold the suspect for
indictment and prosecution. Although other states
specifically require the taking of testimony on the
issue of probable cause within a short time after
arrest,5 the current Illinois statute, unlike previ-
already enacted legislation which attempts to deal
with problems concerning the preliminary hearing.
See note 112 infra and accompanying text. The
Federal Magistrates Act was passed because many
congressmen felt that the preliminary hearing rights
of persons accused of crimes were being violated. In
113 Cong. Rec. at 3244, Senator Tydings is quoted as
saying that in some districts
"small preliminary hearings are not held even
though the grand jury backlog is such that the
delay between presentment and indictment is a
month or more. This is done in at least one im-
portant district by routinely granting continu-
ances to the prosecution, often ex parte, without
any opportunity for the defendant to object."
The abuses which engendered the federal legislation
exist to some extent in many state court systems.
Illinois is not exempt from, nor is it unique in, the
problems attendant upon delays in granting preliminary
hearings. Justice White has suggested that these prob-
lems may become more acute. Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1970).
3 See generally McIntyre, A Study of Judicial Dom-
inance of the Charging Process, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 463, 466 & n.1 (1968).
Prosecutorial control of the judicial machinery at
this stage of the proceedings also exists because rela-
tively few defendants have counsel at this stage. In
the 219 homicide cases studied in this comment, only
93 defendants had counsel appear for them at some
time before indictment.
4 ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, §109-1 (1969). The Illinois
Appellate Court has rejected the argument that the
misdemeanor defendant has a statutory right to a
preliminary hearing. People v. Miner, 85 lU.App.
2d 360, 229 N.E.2d 4 (1967).
5 E.g., CAn. PENAL CODE §860 (West 1956); N.Y.
CODE Casw. Pao. §191 (Mc~inney 1958); NEv. REv.
STAT. §171.196 (1967); ORE. Rxv. STAT. §133.610
(1953); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §10.16.040 (1961).
Some of these statutes arguably speak to adjourn-
ments once the taking of testimony has begun and do
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ous versions,' fails to specify when the judge should
hold the required hearing. One would expect that,
in the absence of specific direction as to time, au-
thorities would be compelled to proceed within a
reasonable period after the suspect's first appear-
ance before the courtY Yet this gap in the statute
makes it possible for the prosecutor to secure
unlimited continuances of the probable cause
hearing,s subject only to the requirement that
trial on an indictment begin within 120 days after
arrest.9
Despite section 109-I's requirement of a hearing,
the Illinois Supreme Court has held that when a
prosecutor obtains an indictment from the grand
jury during a continuance of the preliminary
hearing, 0 the defendant's right to such hearing
and discovery of the prosecutor's case is lost.'1
not cover continuances of the hearing before it has
begun. The statutes' judicial gloss, however, rules out
this reading. See Odell v. Burke, 281 F.2d 782 (7th
Cir. 1960) (Wisconsin); United States ex rel. Wheeler
v. Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); State
v. Enriquez, 102 Ariz. 402, 430 P.2d 422 (1967); Ex
parte Schefstad, 49 Cal. App. 2d 306, 121 P.2d 755
(1942).6 Until the revised Illinois Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure appeared in 1963, Illinois, like the states in
note 5 supra, required that the probable cause hearing
take place within ten days after the suspect's first
court appearance. IT.L. Rsv. STAT. ch. 38, §§674, 679
(1963). Section 45-3 (a) of the tentative draft of the
new Code required the hearing "within a reasonable
time," but even this language was omitted from the
final version. It is unclear why the new Code left this
point so ambiguous.
7See, e.g., Fc parle Chambers, 32 Cal.App. 476,
163 P. 223 (1917).8 See, e.g., United States v. Delman, 253 F. Supp.
383 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (four-year delay of preliminary
hearing); Whalen v. Cristell, 161 Kan. 747, 173 P.2d
252 (1946) (six months); People v. Den Uyl, 320 Mich.
477, 31 N.W.2d 699 (1949) (eighteen months); State
v. Caffey, 438 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. 1969) (eleven months);
-Greenberg, note 1 supra, at 109; Younger, Hearings
.on the U.S. Commissioner System Before the Subcomm.
.on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3,
.at 220-22 (1966).
9 ILT- REv. STAT. ch. 38, §103-5 (1969).
RoPeople v. Petruso, 35 Ill.2d 578, 221 N.E.2d 276
'196b); accord, People v. Vleck, 68 Ill.App.2d 178,
215 N.E. 2d 673 (1966).
2 Theoretically, when the defendant receives a
prelinimary hearing, he might not gain much informa-
tion about the prosecution's case nor gather many
statements for later use as impeachment of trial tes-
timony. See People v. Jones, 75 Ill. App. 2d 332, 221
N.F-.2d 29 (1966); O'Shea, The Preliminary Hearing
in Illinois-Nature and Practice, 57 Ill. B.J. 556, 558-59
(1969). And the judge may stop the hearing whenever
the state establishes probable cause. See People v.
Bonner, 37 Ill. 2d 553, 560, 229 N.E.2d 527, 531 (1967).
Nevertheless, if a preliminary hearing does take place,
many judges give the defendant more of a full-blown
trial than the appellate decisions allow. See McIntyre,
Once the grand jury has undertaken its secret
determination of probable cause, the preliminary
hearing judge need not make a second finding on
that issue.12 Should a judge refuse to grant all the
continuances a prosecutor may desire, the latter
can still avoid a preliminary hearing by dismissing
the police charges, freeing the defendant, and
seeking an indictment at his convenience. 3 A prose-
cutor intent upon denying a defendant his right
to a preliminary hearing can easily accomplish his
objective. The motivation for doing so arises from a
desire to deny a defendant discovery opportunities
inherent in the hearing procedure.
The preliminary hearing is designed to insure a
suspect the right to an immediate legal opinion on
the validity of his arrest.14 The prosecutor's power
to foreclose a hearing as long as he moves either to
dismiss or to seek the opinion of the grand jury
threatens that right. In cases where police have
made a valid arrest, the prosecutor should be able
to make his decision within a few days. He holds no
inherent power to incarcerate a suspect for an
indefinite period of time while he builds a case.'5
If, for any reason, the prosecutor is unable or
unwilling to reach a decision, the judicial branch
should make a determination of the suspect's
right to freedom.'6 Recently enacted federal law
recognizes this approach to the problem. Federal
magistrates are required to conduct a probable
cause hearing within ten days after the arrest of a
jailed suspect unless the prosecutor obtains an
indictment within that time. 7 Illinois, however
note 3 supra, at 466 n.1. Interviews with judges in
Chicago revealed the reason for this liberality. By
holding the prosecutor to higher standards, the judge
assures that he will not be wasting a brother judge's
time in requiring the latter to try an indictment that
the state cannot approve under those more rigorous
standards. This far-sighted view of judicial adminis-
tration should be compared with the view held by
deputy coroners, which is discussed in notes 50-52
infra and accompanying text.
12E.g., People v. Jones, 9 Ill.2d 481, 138 N.E.2d
522 (1956); People v. Jones, 408 Il. 89, 96 N.E.2d
515 (1951).
1People v. Rinks, 80 Ill. App. 2d 152, 224 N.E. 2d
29 (1967).
'4 See, e.g., State v. Kanistanaux, 68 Wash. 2d 652,
414 P.2d 784 (1966) as well as discussion in note 1
supra.
1"See United States v. Worms, 25 Fed. Cas. 773
(No. 16,765) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1859); Ex parte Chambers,
32 Cal. App. 476, 163 P. 223 (1917); Weinreb, Hearings
on S. 3475 Before 1he Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judical Macdnery of tl Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 105 (1966).
16 See generally Greenberg, note 1 sepra, at 109.
" 18 U.S.C.A. §3060 (b)(1), (e)(1969). See United
States v. Meyers, 303 F. Supp. 1383 (D.D.C. 1969);
H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1968).
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appears to leave open the possibility of unbridled
prosecutorial discretion, thereby allowing the
State's Attorney to exploit his potential power.
FRELD S my: P Lnu ARY HauNGS IN
Ho rCIDE CASES
This study focused on the operation of pre-
liminary hearings in homicide cases, since de-
fendants suspected of such crimes seldom gain
freedom on bond.18 Furthermore, pre-trial dis-
covery in these cases poses the greatest threat to
the prosecutor.19 Indeed, if any inequities result
from the murky state of the Illinois law on pre-
liminary hearings, they would surely affect the
homicide suspect.
The compilation of the data20 regarding pre-
liminary hearings in homicide cases evoked a
striking pattern. The data revealed that the State's
Attorney has been extremely successful in denying
homicide defendants preliminary hearings. He has
effectively protected himself from pre-trial dis-
covery in these cases2 In a sample of 219 cases,
only two defendants realized a judicial finding of
probable cause. 2 All other defendants were either
indicted before a hearing could take place (133)
or saw their cases dropped by the prosecutor with-
out a judicial hearing (83).21
18 See the discussion in note 36 infra.
19 By contrast, prosecutors in Cook County appear
to favor preliminary hearings in most rape cases because
they often have substantial doubts about the credi-
bility of their complaining witnesses.
20 The docket books of the Clerk of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, Municipal Division, were searched
for the file numbers of all cases involving homicide
charges filed between January 1, 1969, and August 31,
1969. After discarding those files with incomplete
entries, 219 files remained available for inspection.
Careful note was made of each court appearance by
each defendant. The time between first court appear-
ance and indictment, release on bond, or eventual
release without indictment for those not given bond
was computed for each defendant.
It must be remembered, of course, that those released
without indictments were not necessarily "cleared"
in the sense that the prosecutor dropped the charges
because he became convinced of their innocence. For
example, if a defendant claims self-defense in a killing
that had no witnesses, he is likely to be freed by the
prosecutor who has little chance of proving the sus-
pect's guilt.
21 Able attorneys make up for these lost discovery
opportunities by conducting hearings on motions to
suppress every conceivable sort of evidence. On balance,
the prosecutor may not protect himself as much as
he thinks.
2 These "hearings" probably involved the judge's
reading of the transcript of the coroner's inquest, and
an intuitive disagreement with his recommendation.
See text following note 38 infra.
The prosecutor later entered a nolle prosequi in one
of these two cases.
21 Thirty seven individuals were released on a finding
This wholesale denial of preliminary hearings
would not be alarming if defendants were spending
short periods of time in jail while the State's At-
torney considered his strategy. However, these
defendants spent considerable time in the Cook
County jail before it was determined whether there
wasprobable cause to detain them for prosecution.
In sum, the defendants experienced an average
63-day delay between first court appearance and
indictment or release. Those with counsel (93)
waited an average of 70 days; those without
counsel (126)24 spent an average of 58 days in the
county jail. Those released under either a judicial
finding of no probable cause, 25 return of no bill by
the grand jury, or dismissal by the prosecutor
experienced an average 77-day delay if they had
counsel and a 62-day delay if they had no lawyer.
By contrast, those indicted waited 57 or 58 days
respectively until indictments were returned.
of no probable cause. It would be a mistake, however,
to say that these individuals had a hearing in the
sense that they had the opportunity to engage in the
discovery of a case that might be presented against
them on the trial of an indictment. Generally, the
finding of no probable cause is suggested to the judge
by the prosecutor before hearing or is automatic upon
the finding of justifiable homicide by the coroner. The
judge studies the coroner's verdict and transcript of
the proceedings. The prosecutor makes no attempt to
argue against the finding of no probable cause that
almost inevitably follows this study of the coroner's
record. This practice leads one to wonder how much of
a hand the prosecutor's office has in the inquest verdict.
There were, in all, 85 cases that the prosecutor did
not prosecute. One of these was the case mentioned in
note 22 supra, in which the prosecutor had a finding of
probable cause and later dropped the charges. In
another case, the defendant waived a preliminary
hearing (the only one to do so), but later received the
benefit of a noll prosequi. It must be noted that he
waived his hearing after two continuances, for the
state had kept him in jail for more than a month.24When this comment was initially prepared, the
Illinois court did not require the appointment of
counsel at the preliminary hearing unless the indigent
entered a plea at that time. People v. Bonner, 37 Ill.
2d 553, 229 N.E.2d 527 (1967). Other jurisdictions
had taken the same position. E.g., Wilson v. Harris,
351 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1965).
After the period of time studied in this comment and
even after the writing of this comment, the Supreme
Court handed down Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970), requiring the appointment of counsel for a
preliminary hearing. Accord, People v. Adams, 46
Ill.2d 200, 263 N.E.2d 490 (1970) (refusing retroactive
application of Coleman). Nevertheless, the author
observed in September, 1970, that in homicide cases
appointment of counsel was being made only after
arraignment to the indictment. If one studies the
Court's rationale, he can understand Illinois's disre-
gard for Coleman-at least in murder cases, where the
prisoner receives no preliminary hearing, anyway.
See 399 U.S. at 9, 17-18.25 As pointed out in note 23 supra, this characteri-
zation may be a misnomer.
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Thus, those suspects not indicted waited longer
to obtain release than those who waited only to
receive news of their indictment. Moreover, these
averages mask the extreme delays apparent in a
number of cases. One suspect waited 182 days be-
fore the grand jury indicted him.2 6 Two other
defendants were indicted 134 and 154 days after
their arrests, although neither had asked for a
continuance. In light of the "120-day rule," both
indictments seem fruitless exercises unless per-
Imps the prosecutor used them to pressure the
defendants to testify against others.
In absolute terms, a two-month delay should be
unacceptable;F for most murders occur between
family and friends 8 and admit of quick solution
with easy marshalling of evidence once an arrest
has been made. 29 Moreover, a recent sample of
similar delays in cases involving a cross-section of
substantive charges revealed that the lag-period
21 Since he had asked for a continuance during this
period, he could not avail himself of the "120 day"
rule and its dismissal-of-the-charges sanction. IL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §103-5 (1969).
27See United States v. Worms, 25 Fed. Cas. 773
(No. 16, 765) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1859). Authorities who
testified on bills that later became enacted as 18
U.S.C.A. §3060 (1969) objected to its requirement
that a hearing or indictment occur within ten days
after first appearance before the magistrate. They felt
that even ten days was too oppressive on the defendant.
E.g., Weinreb, note 15 supra, at 105.
2 A memorandum prepared by the commander of
the homicide detectives, Chicago Police Department,
showed that in 1967 only 145 murder victims out of a
total of 552 did not know their slayer through some
relationship, either personal or business-related.
29One prosecutor who presents cases before the
grand jury said in an interview that once he knows
the pathologist's finding on cause of death, he can seek
an indictment within, at most, a few days after arrest.
An experienced homicide detective confirmed this
opinion.
Interviews with deputy coroners revealed that the
coroner's pathologists perform autopsies on the same
day that bodies are brought to the coroner. The pa-
thologist makes his report into a dictaphone while he
performs the autopsy. However, a few weeks elapse
before the pathologist's report (the protocol) is typed
by the coroner's secretaries. Nevertheless, it would be
possible for the prosecutor to obtain this information
without waiting for the protocol to be typed.
Delay in the indictment process also sets in when a
witness does not appear as scheduled to testify before
the grand jury. Rather than introduce that person's
testimony as hearsay and take the chance of being
forced to try an indictment without a key witness
(which might alter the State's Attorney's official won-
loss statistics), the prosecutor will schedule the case
for some time in the next calendar month and issue
a second subpoena. Obviously, this solicitude for the
defendant, which is how this practice was explained,
cuts both ways, as the findings in the text fully demon-
strate.
in each case averaged only 27 days. 1 Even the
27-day delay far exceeds a Presidential task force
recommendation of three days between first ap-
pearance and actual hearing.n
Follow-up interviews revealed the local customs
that produced the data compiled in this study.n
When the homicide suspect first appears in felony
court, 13 the judge automatically continues the case
three to six weeks at the prosecutor's request.m The
prosecutor is afforded broad discretion to make a
request of this sort.35 To justify the practice, it is
said that the continuance enables the county coro-
ner to conduct an inquest. If the coroner's jury
recommends grand jury action and the prosecutor
agrees with the finding, he will seek more continu-
ances until an indictment is returned. These con-
tinuances are freely granted.36 Judges refuse to hold
-0 Banfield & Anderson, Continuances in the Cook
County Criminal Courts, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 259, 314
(1968) (Table 35).31 See United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Flood, 269
F. Supp. 194, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). The common law
also seems to have settled on a three-day rule. See
note 85 infra.
- Interviews were conducted with judges, prose-
cutors, and public defenders who were working or
had worked in the Cook County Felony Court, where
all pre-indictment court appearances for homicide
defendants occur.
-1 Until some time in April, 1969, homicide suspects
made their first court appearances in Branches 42,
43, and 49 (Boys Court) as well as in felony court.
" See generally McIntyre, note 3 supra, at 483. This
view has prevailed in other jurisdictions. See United
States v. Gray, 87 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1949). Reform
in the federal courts has come about, as noted in the
text accompanying note 17 supra.35 McIntyre, note 3 supra, at 472. Some jurisdictions
are remarkably strict in allowing continuances of the
preliminary hearing. See Hill v. Sheriff of Clark County,
85 Nev. 234, 452 P.2d 918 (1969).
36 Even if the grand jury refuses to indict, the de-
fendant may spend considerable time in jail because of
administrative delays. The Chicago Daily News of
July 30, 1970, reported on page 4 that a street gang
member was released from Cook County jail more than
a month after the grand jury refused to indict. Once
again, earlier appointment of counsel would remedy
this deficiency.
The homicide defendant can ask for a hearing to
set bond at any time he can demonstrate that the
proof is not "evident" or that the presumption is not
"great." ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, §110-4 (1969). He will
receive this hearing within a few days after his request.
The hearing may help the defendant discover the state's
case; but the state can foreclose discovery as well as
keep the defendant in jail by agreeing, without a
hearing, to bail in a sum that he cannot meet. In the
sample of cases, bail was requested by 23 suspects.
The court rejected the motion in only five of these
cases (four of these persons were later indicted). In
one case bail was granted on the day of indictment;
in another, a nolle prosequi was entered on the same
day. In eleven cases the defendant was unable to post
the cash required and had to wait in jail for further
[Vol. 62
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the hearing required by section 109-1. They seem to
feel that the inquest grants the suspect a de facto
probable cause hearing. They feel that a second
hearing would cover the same ground and not
help the defendant, unless he convincingly argues
that he has access to evidence not presented at the
inquest. Rarely does a defendant make such a rep-
resentation. Hence, after an inquest verdict that
recommends grand jury action, the defendant can
expect to spend considerable time in jail unless the
prosecutor refrains from following the coroner's
advice and dismisses the case.P
If the coroner does not recommend grand jury
action, the judge, after examining the transcript
of the coroner's inquest and receiving some evi-
dence from the arresting officer, will usually find
that probable cause is lacking' In rare instances,
the judge will bind the defendant over to a grand
jury without the coroner's recommendation. One
judge remembered only two cases in which he had
done so.
These interviews laid to rest any notion that the
long delays were caused by defendants. In fact,
there were fewer than forty cases in which the
defendant asked for a continuance or joined in
the state's motion for one. However, the interviews
did indicate that the occasional request by a de-
fendant for a continuance was probably un-
necessary since, had the defendant not made the
request, the state would have done so.P9
The study indicated that the coroner system is
the justification for, if not the cause of, the auto-
matic continuances at the prosecutor's disposal.
One prosecutor, who formerly worked in the felony
court, pointed out that, when he had disposed of
some cases before the coroner had an opportunity
to hold inquests, the latter resented what he con-
sidered encroachment on his domain. One judge
observed that the office of coroner is constitu-
tional40 and thus reasoned that any continuance
proceedings. In only five cases did the defendant post
bond and gain his freedom before a decision on prob-
able cause was made. In two of these cases, the de-
fendant had to wait a month before he could raise the
money for bail.
37 Alternatively, the prosecutor may enter a nolle
prosequi or move to strike the case from the docket.
It is unclear how the prosecutor chooses between his
options since each leaves open further action should
he change his mind. But see Oaks & Lehman, The
Criminal Process of Cook County and the Indigent
Defendant, 1966 U. Ri. L. F. 584, 620-22.
"8 See note 23 supra.
9 Were the defendant to have experienced counsel
before indictment, this unnecessary and harmful
request might not be made.
40 Ir. CoN. art. 10, §8 (1870).
policy involving the coroner was beyond reproach.
Consequently, an examination of the coroner sys-
tem is necessary to comprehend the problem at
hand.
The office of county coroner dates back to medie-
val times.a In Illinois the coroner is charged with
the task of inquiry into all violent, accidental,
and suspicious deaths.42 At one time the coroner
was an investigative officer.' At present, he func-
tions more as a judicial officer, waiting for the
police and prosecution to bring him evidence
against suspected criminals. There is neither
statutory nor case authority for the practice of
holding a coroner's inquest prior to a hearing on
probable cause. To allow the inquest to foreclose a
preliminary examination, then, is inexcusable."
However, if the magistrate were to hold his hearing
first and free or detain the suspect, the coroner,
having no such power,45 would witness the reduc-
tion of his proceedings to the status of mere statu-
tory formality. The prestige of his office would
indeed be threatened.
Continued regard for the coroner's political
well-being operates at the expense of individual
defendants. An examination of the coroner's
records" indicated that 436 cases were recom-
mended for grand jury action. Only 89 cases were
termed instances of justifiable homicide, which
amounts to a finding of no probable cause. If
these figures are adjusted downward to compen-
sate for the smaller number of felony court cases
studied, it appears that he recommended no grand
jury action in only 41 cases. On the other hand, the
prosecutor dismissed, one way or another, 85
cases--almost twice as many "washouts" as the
coroner recommended.
It is easy to understand why the coroner is more
4 Comment, The Wisconsin Coroner System, 1951
Wis. L. REv. 529.
42 ITL. R:v. STAT. ch. 31, §10 (1969).4
3Adler, Coroners' Inquests: The Impact of Walls,
15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 97, 99 (1967).
"1 Compare r1i. REv. STAT. ch 38, § 109-1 (1969),
with ch. 31, §10.
45 See note 56 infra.
46 The period between February 1, 1969, and Septem-
ber 30, 1969, was examined to obtain a better com-
parison with the period in which defendants made
their first court appearances (January 1 to August 31),
since the inquest usually takes place one month after
first court appearance.
47 A prosecutor who handles cases before the grand
jury emphasized that he feels in no way bound by the
coroner's findings and gives a "fresh look" to each
case. One wonders how many additional washouts
would result if the judge were to take as active a role




likely to recommend further action. The proce-
dures of his inquest are so restricted that it would
be unwise to free a suspected murderer based on
the coroner's finding. The coroner is likely to
protect himself by erring on the side of caution and
by recommending indictment in all but the most
obvious cases. In instances of suspected murder,
the coroner conducts an autopsy on the body of
the deceased and holds an inquest at which his
autopsy report, along with other evidence, is
introduced.48 A deputy coroner presides over the
inquest with a six-man jury present to hear the
testimony. Generally, a policeman serves as chief
witness and "prosecutor" at the hearing. 4 He
recounts most of the evidence that the police care
to divulge. 50 The deputy coroner neither permits
extensive questioning by interested parties,"
nor allows these parties the opportunity to intro-
duce their own evidence.52 Yet the suspect, typi-
"s The taking of testimony at an inquest generally
occupies five to twenty minutes.
," One interviewee thought this was an advantage
for the defendant since the defendant might obtain
better discovery if a lawyer were not representing the
state. Even if the defendant has a lawyer representing
him, he may have little advantage, as the text at notes
50-52 infra suggests.
50 Most of the evidence proferred is classic hearsay.
Deputy coroners who were interviewed had no doubts
that hearsay could be introduced, because the coroner's
findings are not binding on anyone (a correct view from
a strict legal viewpoint, but one unaware of the prac-
tices reported in the text accompanying notes 32-38
supra). Prosecutors and judges, however, although they
acknowledged that hearsay was admissible in pre-
liminary hearings, were reluctant to admit it except
on a trivial issue or on an issue which could most
assuredly be proven with admissible evidence if the
case ever came to trial. Unlike the deputy coroners,
they took an extremely farsighted view of the evidence
problem and did not want to send a reject farther
down the judicial production line. Even though their
motivations may not be entirely altruistic (a desire
to ease the court backlog or a desire that the prosecutor
not lose cases after indictment), their views do benefit
the defendant who can secure a preliminary hearing.
51 Deputy coroners emphasized that they allow a
lawyer to "ask questions" as a matter of "courtesy"
or "privilege," but do not allow a lawyer to "cross-
examine." They felt they have absolute discretion to
control the examination of a witness and may cut a
lawyer off at any time. One reason for this aversion to
lengthy proceedings was explained as follows: The
county has to pay for a typed transcript of every
inquest that takes place. If a lawyer can conduct a
lengthy examination of witnesses, he is reaping dis-
covery benefits for which the county must pay. A
deputy coroner will allow a lawyer to ask enough
questions that he will appear, in his client's eyes, to be
earning his fee. Since there is no way to appeal a deputy
coroner's rulings, the lawyer must be satisfied with his
restricted role.
'1 Once again, by contrist, prosecutors and judges,
with regard to preliminary hearings took the liberal
view outlined in note 50 supra.
cally unrepresentedn but warned of his "rights," is
generally asked to testify. After this hearing, the
jury exits to a deliberation room. The deputy
enters the jury room from another entrance and
presents it with a prepared verdict for its signa-
ture. ' The jury's presence often represents a statu-
tory formality,55 with the criteria used by the
deputy coroner in preparing his verdicts for the
jurors being entirely unclear. For these reasons the
coroner can only recommend action. He can neither
free nor detain the suspect. 56 His verdict has no
legal effect except that it effectively denies the
defendant a preliminary hearing.Y
LEGAL TmEORIES TO CHANGE PRESENT PRACTICE
The Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure en-
visions a speedy preliminary hearing for the felony
suspect. s If the state deprives him of this hearing
by securing many continuances, the defendant may
well wonder what remedies the law provides him
for this denial of a hearing and attendant, often
lengthy, incarceration. First, he may seek a writ of
habeas corpus at any time before indictment.
Second, once he stands under indictment, dis-
missal of the charge may be sought before trial.
After trial, reversal of any conviction may possibly
be obtained if the earlier motion to dismiss was
53 See text accompanying note 24 supra. Presumably,
this practice has not changed since the writing of this
paper. See note 24 supra as well as People v. Murdock,
39 Ill.2d 553, 237 N.E.2d 442 (1968).
rA See Comment, The Office of Coroner vs. The Medical
Examiner System, 46 J. CrIM. L.C. & P.S. 232, 233 &
n. 8 (1955).
11 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 31, §15 (1969).
56 See ILL. Rxv. STAT. ANn. ch. 31, §24 (1970 Supp);
Devine v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 270 fll.
504, 110 N.E. 780 (1915); Inbau, Preliminary Actions
and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, 1953 U. ILL. L.F.
313, 321.
17 In taking the view outlined in the text accom-
panying notes 34-37 supra, the interviewees appeared
to rest on custom, although not one seemed to know
when, how, or why the custom originated. No inter-
viewee pointed to any statute or case that would
validate present practice.
At common law, the coroner's verdict operated as a
grand jury indictment and cut off the defendant's
right to a preliminary hearing. The defendant was
actually tried on the coroner's verdict. Ex Parte An-
derson, 55 Ark. 527, 18 S.W. 856 (1892); State v.
Mason, 115 S.C. 214, 103 S.E. 286 (1920). However,
the common law can hardly be said to have survived
in the face of the Illinois constitutional right to indict-
ment by grand jury, ILL. CoN. art. 2, §8 (1870), and
Ifm. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §109-1 (1969), which without
qualification gives a preliminary hearing to all persons
arrested. See also In re Sly, 9 Ida. 779, 76 P. 766 (1904);
Devine v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 270 ll.
504, 110 N.E. 780 (1915); State v. Elfer, 115 La. 964,
40 So. 370 (1905).
58 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §109-1 (1969).
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improperly denied. 9 In establishing his right to
any of these remedies, the defendant may base his
claim on any one of four theories: (1) denial of a
statutory right; (2) denial of due process; (3) denial
of the constitutional right to a speedy trial; or (4)
denial of equal protection of law.6°
Denial of a Substantial Statutory Right
If the defendant seeks relief on the ground that
he has been deprived of his statutory right to a
preliminary hearing, the argument is compelling,
although Illinois law is unsettled. Those who insist
upon allowing much to the discretion of the prose-
cutor win sympathy in the trial courts.8' Neverthe-
less, it would be inaccurate to assert that the
Illinois Supreme Court has explicitly sanctioned
practices that effectively deny suspects an expedi-
ent preliminary hearing. Section 109-1 authorizes
the right to a hearing without exception." Some
deference ought to be paid to that statute.
The leading cases in which the court has upheld
indictment without preliminary hearing" were
decided when Illinois required such a hearing to be
held within ten days after initial appearance
before a magistrate." None of those cases suggests
that the indictment in question was secured pursu-
ant to a violation of the ten-day statute. The
court's most recent pronouncement in this area,
People v. Petruso,s5 was decided under the present
Code of Criminal Procedure. An intervening in-
dictment was allowed to cut off the defendant's
right to a preliminary hearing since the defendant
had, in the meantime, obtained a continuance in
order to hire a lawyer.
59 If the denial of a preliminary hearing constitutes
an evil because it denies the defendant valuable dis-
covery opportunities, then there would be a third
procedural device; the defendant would seek a pre-
liminary hearing to be held immediately before indict-
ment or at any time after indictment. See Wilson v.
Anderson, 335 F.2d 687, 691 n. 9 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(Bazelon, Ch.j., dissenting). Congress appears to have
rejected this suggestion when it enacted 18 U.S.C.A.
§3060 (1969). But see 8 J. MooRE, Mooi's FEDERAL
PRAcricE, 5.04 [31 (Cipes ed. 1969 Supp.).
EO The Supreme Court long ago pronounced in often-
cited dictum that failure to hold a preliminary hearing
does not violate the defendant's constitutional right
to confront his accusers. Goldsby v. United States,
160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895); accord, People v. Petruso, 35
Ill.2d 578, 221 N.E.2d 276 (1966).
6 See text accompanying notes 3-13 supra.
6See also ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, §109-3 (1969).
63 See the cases cited in note 12 supra.
cSee note 6 supra.
65 35 Ill.2d 578, 221 N.E.2d 276 (1966).
[I]t is apparent that the reason no preliminary
hearing was conducted was because the defendant
was seeking a lawyer of his own choosing.
6
Indeed, if a defendant seeks a continuance in order
to delay proceedings, or if the state seeks an indict-
ment within a reasonably short time, indictment
without hearing does not violate the spirit of the
preliminary hearing statute. Petruso, however,
does not go so far as to sanction the emasculation
of the statute effected in Cook County with regard
to homicide cases.
Courts in other states with statutes specifically
requiring a hearing within a certain number of
days have given defendants relief for delay or
denial of preliminary hearings. They have either
dismissed the indictment before trial or reversed
any subsequent conviction." In all instances, the
state was given the opportunity to refile charges
if it wished. These courts have not required a
showing of prejudice to the outcome of the trial
resulting from delay.' s If they were to have made
such a requirement, no grounds for enforcement
of the statutes would have remained since the
interest protected by them--a defendant's right
to be detained only upon speedy judicial finding of
probable cause--has little 9 impact on the outcome
of a trial.0 Indeed, for the will of the legislature to
be given effect, courts must fashion remedies that
take into account the peculiar nature of the interest
protected by the statute~n
66 rd. at 581, 221 N.E.2d at 278. The continuance
postponed the hearing date less than a month.
67 State v. Juarez, 5 Ariz. App. 431, 427 P.2d 565
(1967); People v. Bucher, 175 Cal.App.2d 343, 346
P.2d 202 (1959); State ex rel. Klinkiewicz v. Duffy,
35 Wis.2d 369, 151 N.W.2d 63 (1967); cf. Manor v.
State, 221 Ga. 866, 148 S.E.2d 305 (1966). But see
State ex rel. Haynes v. Powers, 20 Ohio St. 2d 46, 254
N.E.2d 19 (1969).
6But see United States v. Delman, 253 F. Supp.
383 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Cowan, 37
F.R.D. 215, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 396 F.2d 83,
88 (2d Cir. 1968); People v. Wickham, 13 Mich. App.
650, 164 N.E.2d 681 (1968). But see generally People v.
Tetter, 42 1ll.2d 569, 250 N.E.2d 433 (1969). More-
over, these cases imply that prejudice results only if
the delay causes the defendant to lose evidence, not
if it helps the prosecution obtain evidence.
60 Perhaps the defendant may lose evidence by being
held in jail and not being able to find witnesses. Proving
a negative proposition of this sort seems impossible
in all but a small number of cases.
70The right to a public trial is another interest that
may have almost no impact on the trial's outcome.
Thus, courts require only a showing of the violation,
not prejudicial effects as well. Thompson v. People,
156 Colo. 416, 425-26, 399 P.2d 776, 781 (1965); State
v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 88, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807
(1966).
71See People v. Bucher, 175 Cal.App.2d 343, 347,
1971]
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The remedy of dismissal of an indictment with-
out prejudice is preferable to the alternative of
release upon habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is
available only before indictment,n which makes it
an extremely impractical remedy for the defendant
on two grounds. Many defendants lack the assist-
ance of counsel until arraignment to the indict-
mentn and would not recognize the availability of
this remedy. Second, even if the defendant were
experienced enough to seek a writ of habeas corpus
or had a lawyer willing to seek this remedy, the
judge would likely grant a continuance of the
habeas corpus hearing.74 The prosecutor in the
meantime can obtain an indictment and "moot"
the application for habeas corpus,75 often at the
expense of a defendant against whom he might not
normally proceed if he were allowed to take his
timeY6 The potential for habeas corpus relief does
little to penalize a prosecutor and may penalize
the defendant, already deprived of his rights.
Due Process
The defendant might also raise the constitu-
tional argument that judicial practices delaying
the preliminary hearing deprive him of liberty
346 P.2d 202, 204-05 (1959). But see generally People
v. Petruso, 35 Ill.2d 578, 580, 221 N.E.2d 276, 277
(1966).
71 E.g., United States v. Green, 305 F. Supp. 125
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States ex rel. Wheeler v.
Flood, 269 F.Supp. 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); United
States v. Brace, 192 F. Supp. 714 (D.Md. 1961) (dic-
tum); Ex parte Schefstad, 49 Cal.App.2d 306, 121
P.2d 755 (1942); Whalen v. Cristell, 161 Kan. 747,
173 P.2d 252 (1946); Ex parte Ah Kee, 22 Nev. 374,
40 P. 879 (1895); State ex rel. Haynes v. Powers, 20
Ohio St. 2d 46, 254 N.E.2d 19 (1969); State v. Foster,
14 N.D. 561, 105 N.W. 938 (1905); Hill v. Smith, 107
Va. 848, 59 S.E. 475 (1907); contra, Blue v. United
States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
71 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
The state is usually given thirty days to respond
to a habeas corpus petition of a convicted prisoner.
75 It is likely that the prosecutor could obtain an
indictment if he pressed for it. Oaks & Lehman, note
37 supra, at 623, report that in Cook County the prose-
cutor obtains a true bill in more than 90% of the cases
he presents to the grand jury. For the effect this true
bill would have on the habeas corpus petition, see
United States v. Universita, 192 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y.
1961).7
6 Ordinarily, the prosecutor waits until his witnesses
come in. He does not usually obtain an indictment on
hearsay. See note 29 supra. If he eventually discovers
that the witnesses are persons on whom he cannot
depend to testify before the grand jury, he will not
bother to indict, since he feels that they will be difficult
to obtain for trial. If pressed for an indictment, though,
he might proceed before the grand jury with hearsay
and later drop the indictment when the witnesses fail
to appear for trial as well. In the meantime, of course,
the defendant remains in jail.
without due process of law, as guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendmentY7 In opposition to that
argument, broad language has been forwarded in
case law to the effect that a defendant holds no
constitutional right to a preliminary hearingY
Nevertheless, an examination of additional cases
that have offered more than mere invocation of
that language reveals that it holds little, if any,
relation to the facts of the problem at hand. The
leading case in the field, Lem Woon v. Oregon,7 9
held that a state may establish a prosecution-by-
information system and dispense with the neces-
sity of a preliminary hearing. Put another way, no
state need enact a preliminary hearing statute in
order to afford its citizens due process. Obviously,
Lem Woon does not speak to the case in which a
state enacts a preliminary hearing statute and then
ignores it.0 From Lero Woon it follows that a state
may refrain from providing for a preliminary hear-
ing if a grand jury is in session when the defendant
is taken into custody~n In such cases official deter-
mination that probable cause existed for keeping
the defendant in custody would have followed
shortly.
At most, then, the Supreme Court has implied
that a state may, consistent with due process,
deprive a person of a preliminary hearing if it
makes a showing of probable cause through some
other means within a reasonably short time.n
77 The Supreme Court, although moving toward a
view that "due process" under the fourteenth amend-
ment is shorthand for the Bill of Rights, as Mr. Justice
Black suggested in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 71-72 (1947), also currently uses the concept as an
independent device (ensuring "fundamental fairness")
for protecting the defendant. See, e.g., In re Winship,
396 U.S. 885 (1970); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967). This approach follows the remarks of Mr.
Justice Murphy in Adamson, 332 U.S. at 124.
78 E.g., United States ex rel. Hughes v. Gault, 271
U.S. 142, 149 (1926); United States v. Luxenberg,
374 F.2d 241, 248 (6th Cir. 1968); United States ex
rel. All v. Deegan, 298 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (E.D. Wis.
1969); Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest
Analysis, 51 IOWA L. REv. 164, 174 (1965); Comment,
The Preliminary Hearing in the Federal System: A
Proposal for a Rule Change, 116 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1416 &
n. 3 (1968). But see Goodwin v. Page, 296 F. Supp.
1205 (E.D. Okla. 1969).
79229 U.S. 586 (1913); accord, Ocampo v. United
States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Rivera v. Virgin Islands,
375 F.2d 988 (3d Cir. 1967); State v. Hayes, 127 Conn.
543, 18 A.2d 895 (1941); Anderson v. State, 212 So.2d
56 (Fla. App. 1968); Jones v. Commonwealth, 86 Va.
661, 10 S.E. 1005 (1890); State v. Sureties of Krohne,
4 Wyo. 347, 34 P. 3 (1893).
:0 Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
1 Dillard v. Bomar, 342 F.2d 789 (6th Cir. 1965).
2 One might even take the strict view that, having
established the preliminary hearing by statute, a
state may not deprive the defendant of his statutory
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Careful attention to the facts of leading state
cases bears out this observation. In Webb v. Com-
monwealth," the court found no deprivation of due
process when the grand jury indicted the defendant
before arrest and precluded a preliminary hearing.
The defendant had not been taken into custody
until the grand jury made a finding of probable
cause through its indictment. Likewise, the return
of an indictment two days after the defendant's
arrest was quite properly held to foreclose a pre-
liminary hearing in Bailey v. State.4 Courts have
countenanced similar delays for three days,"1 four
days,8 and up to a week." In short, the grand
jury indictment "moots" the preliminary hearing
only if it is handed down soon after a person is
taken into custodyP This is not the situation in
Cook County homicide cases.
SPeedy Trial
In seeking dismissal of the indictment, a de-
fendant invoking the protection of the sixth amend-
ment right to speedy trial stands upon weak
ground.89 The amendment clearly speaks to trial
delays; delay in the holding of a preliminary
hearing does not, by itself, violate this constitu-
tional provision. Only when a delay of this sort
right for any reason. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574
(1884). But see Burbey v. Burke, 295 F.Supp. 1045
(E.D. Wis. 1969).
204 Va. 24, 129 S.E.2d 22 (1963); accord, Walker
v. Rodgers, 389 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
"215 Ark. 53, 219 S.W.2d 424 (1949).
8" State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d 1 (1964).
There is some suggestion that at common law the
probable cause hearing had to take place within three
days of the suspect's initial appearance before the
magistrate. See 2 W. HAwrs, A TREATiSE OF THE
PLEAS OF TrH CnowN ch. 16, §12 (6th ed. 1788).
8 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. 139, 81 A.2d
569 (1951). See State v. Foster, 14 N.D. 561, 105
N.W. 938 (1905).
"Smith v. O'Brien, -N.H.-, 251 A.2d 323 (1969);
State v. Ollison, 68 Wash.2d 65, 411 P.2d 419 (1966).
"3 See United States v. Meyers, 303 F. Supp. 1383
(D.D.C. 1969); Kardy v. Shook, 237 Md. 524, 207
A.2d 83 (1965); State v. Mastrian, 285 Minn. 51, 171
N.W.2d 695 (1969); In re Wiggins, 425 P.2d 1004
(Okla. Crim. 1967).
The new Illinois constitution enacted December 15,
1970, appears to recognize an even stricter due process
standard. "No person shall be held.., for a crime...
unless either the initial charge has been brought by
indictment... or the person has been given a prompt
preliminary hearing to establish probable cause." ILL.
CoN. art. I, §7, cl. 2 (1970) (emphasis added). Unless
the defendant is arrested after indictment, as in note
83 supra, he has an absolute right to a hearing, which
post-arrest indictment may not cut off.
89 U.S. CON. amend. 6: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial.
... " The Illinois constitution makes substantially the
same provision in art. II, §9.
postpones actual trial on the merits can the amend-
ment's protection possibly be invoked.8 '
Moreover, the majority of courts passing on the
question have held that the period of time to be
considered in computing a denial of speedy trial
begins to run only with the return of an indict-
ment."1 By statute, however, speedy trial protec-
tion attaches to Illinois defendants upon arrest.
Absent any delays caused by the defendant, he
must receive trial within 120 days after arrest if
he is held in jail pending trial, or 160 days after a
demand for trial if he remains free on bond."
These statutory provisions grant defendants a
more liberal right to speedy trial than does the
common law. 3 It is unlikely that a court would
strike down these statutory definitions of speedy
trial.' 4 The defendant holds no specific constitu-
tional guarantee of a speedy preliminary hearing;
he possesses a constitutional right to a speedy trial
on the merits.9" The rationale behind requiring
speedy trial-preventing a man presumed inno-
cent from languishing in jail-ought to be sufficient
justification for a speedy preliminary hearing.9
Considering that the state need only meet a lower
burden of proof at such hearings, the argument
for imposing on the state temporal requirements in
"0See United States v. Brace, 192 F. Supp. 714
(D.Md. 1961).
91Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.
1962); State v. Maldonado, 92 Ariz. 70, 373 P.2d 583
(1962); Inverarity v. Zumwalt, 97 Okla. Crin. 294,
262 P.2d 725 (1953); State v. Caffey 438 S.W.2d 167
(Mo. 1969); contra, D'Aguino v. United States, 192
F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951); People v. Den Uyl, 320
Mich. 477, 31 N.W.2d 699 (1948); State ex rd. Freden-
berg v. Byrne, 20 Wis.2d 504, 123 N.W.2d 305 (1963).
The ambiguous history of the common law on this
subject apparently supports the theory that the right
to speedy trial attaches upon arrest. See United States
v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512, 515-16 (1880); 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTriMS ON THE LAws OF ENGLANmD 270
(Jones ed. 1916); English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679,
31 Car. II, ch. 2.
"ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §103-5(a), (b) (1969).
"The authorities cited in note 91 supra speak of a
six-month period within which the defendant might
expect trial.
9 On at least one occasion, the Illinois court has
spoken approvingly of the speedy trial statute cited
in note 92 supra. People v. House, 10 Ifl.2d 556, 558,
141 N.E.2d 12, 13 (1957). The leading case on which
the defendant might rely granted relief after an eigh-
teen-month delay. People v. Den Uyl, 320 Mich. 477,
31 N.W.2d 699 (1948). One commentator has doubted
that denial of speedy trial sets in until at least a year
has elapsed. Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal
Trial, 57 CoLu-I. L. Rxv. 846, 852 & n. 38 (1957).
" See, e.g., United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120
(1966); State v. Maldonado, 92 Ariz. 70, 74, 373 P.2d
583, 585 (1962).




going forward with a probable cause hearing be-
comes more persuasive. The language of the
amendment, however, does not support the right
to a speedy preliminary hearing.97
Equal Protection
The other possible argument-that the defend-
ant has been irrationally subjected to treatment
not received by another group of defendants, in
violation of the equal protection clause1--is also
likely to be unsuccessful.9 9 The fourteenth amend-
ment has, to date, aided the defendant in only a
narrow class of cases."° The amendment's amor-
phous character has made it an uncertain weapon
for constitutional attack. It is extremely difficult
to determine those bases of discrimination other
than race or economic status"' that amount to
invidious discrimination in the field of criminal
procedure."' Nevertheless, an accused choosing
to claim a denial of equal protection could contend
that an irrational classification exists where a
homicide suspect"' must wait longer than individu-
als accused of other crimes" 4 for a statutorily
sanctioned'"5 preliminary hearing.06
9But cf. Sheffield v. Reece, 201 Miss. 133, 28 So.2d
745 (1947) (dictum) (delay in bringing prisoner for
initial appearance before the magistrate).
"U.S. CON. amend. XIV, §1 provides,
No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.
The federal statute that confers upon the district
courts jurisdiction to consider civil cases alleging
violations of this constitutional right as well as of others
amplifies the meaning of the constitutional term "law":
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action... to be commenced by any
person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any
State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom
or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States.
... 28 U.S.C. §1343 (1964) (emphasis added).
99 Mr. Justice Holmes once referred to this section
of the amendment as the "usual last resort of con-
stitutional arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,
208 (1927).
200See Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren
Court, 68 MicH. L. R-v. 629, 677-78 (1970).
1"' E.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
x0 Compare North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 722-23 (1969), with Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,
454-56 (1962). But compare Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) with Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395
U.S. 458 (1969), arguably using an equal-protection
argument to invalidate rules of criminal procedure
that required affluence for their full utilization.
"3 In homicide cases, defendants move slowly be-
tween arrest and finding of probable cause or indict-
ment. See text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
I" In non-homicide cases, the lapse between arrest
and indictment is much shorter than in homicide cases.
See note 30 supra.
The argument outlined above is hardly immune
from attack. In considering denial of equal pro-
tection, courts assess "the relative importance of
the subject with respect to which equality is
sought" as well as the "relative invidiousness of
the particular differentiation." 107 Because of the
reason given in the discussion for the right to a
speedy trial,"08 a quick preliminary hearing is a
matter of great importance. On the other hand,
the black jury cases,19 for instance, have raised
the spector of judicial acceptance of unequal
final verdicts, a matter of such great importance
that denial of preliminary hearings might pale by
comparison.
Moreover, defenders of the present system will
contend that the difference in treatment between
homicide and non-homicide cases rests upon a
rational basis. Magistrates grant delays in homicide
preliminary hearings, so that the coroner may hold
inquests and make findings roughly equivalent to
those of the magistrate regarding probable cause
in non-homicide cases." 0 If courts do not choose to
probe the merits and demerits of the coroner sys-
tem, they would probably hold that the difference
in treatment has a rational basis." Without close
examination, the coroner system has a certain
plausibility for equal-protection purposes.
10
5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §109-1 (1969). A reasonable
inference that can be drawn from the statute is that a
person should receive the preliminary hearing within a
reasonably short period of time.
106 Once the defendant establishes that the classi-
fication is irrational, or "suspect," he throws the
burden of justification on the state. See Developments
in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HA v. L. REv. 1065,
1099 (1969).
107 Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Forward:
Constitutional Adjudication and the Pronotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARv. L. Ray. 91, 95 (1966).
118 See note 93 supra.
109 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879). The issue involved concerns the opportunity
to have one's case considered by jurors with a back-
ground similar to that of the defendant. See generally
Note, The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion
in Jury Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process, and
Equal Protection, 74 YAiE L.J. 919 (1965).
11" See Nivitsky v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 276 Ill.
102, 114 N.E. 545 (1917).
IU Only one court has mentioned an equal protection
approach to this sort of problem, and that court dis-
missed it without comment. State v. Mastrian, 285
Minn. 51, 171 N.W.2d 695 (1969).
If one of the defendants in the sample of cases studied
should have wanted to argue that defendants in other
parts of the state received preliminary hearings sooner,
he would have had an even more difficult time estab-
lishing that he was denied equal protection. See gen-
erally New York State Association of Trial Lawyers v.
Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), noted




States with statutes that insufficiently ad-
minister expedient preliminary hearings could solve
their problem by introducing legislation similar to
the recently enacted federal statute1 12 Legislation
U2 18 U.S.C.A. §3060(a)-(e) (1969);
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section,
a preliminary examination shall be held within the
time set by the judge or magistrate pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section, to determine whether
there is probable cause to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the arrested person
has committed it.
(b) The date for the preliminary examination
shall be fixed by the judge or magistrate at the
initial appearance of the arrested person. Except
as provided by subsection (c) of this section, or
unless the arrested person waives the preliminary
examination, such examination shall be held within
a reasonable time following initial appearance, but
in any event not later than-
(1) the tenth day following the date of the initial
appearance of the arrested person before such
officer if the arrested person is held in custody with-
out any provision for release, or is held in custody
for failure to meet the conditions of release im-
posed, or is released from custody only during
specified hours of the day; or
(2) the twentieth day following the date of the
initial appearance if the arrested person is released
from custody under any condition other than a
condition described in paragraph (1) of this
subsection.
(c) With the consent of the arrested person, the
date fixed by the judge or magistrate for the pre-
liminary examination may be a date later than-
that prescribed by subsection (b), or may be
continued one or more times to a date subsequent
to the date initially fixed therefor. In the absence
of such consent of the accused, the date fixed for
the preliminary hearing may be a date later than
that prescribed by subsection (b), or may be
continued to a date subsequent to the date initially
fixed therefor, only upon the order of a judge of the
appropriate United States district court after a
finding that extraordinary circumstances exist,
and that the delay of the preliminary hearing is
indispensable to the interests of justice.
(d) Except as provided by subsection (e) of this
section, an arrested person who has not been
accorded the preliminary examination required by
subsection (a) within the period of time fixed by
the judge or magistrate in compliance with sub-
sections (b) and (c), shall be discharged from cus-
tody or from the requirement of bail or any other
condition of release, without prejudice, however,
to the institution of further criminal proceedings
against him upon the charge upon which he was
arrested.
(e) No preliminary examination in compliance
with subsection (a) of this section shall be required
to be accorded an arrested person, nor shall such
arrested person be discharged from custody or from
the requirement of bail or any other condition of
release pursuant to subsection (d), if at any time
subsequent to the initial appearance of such person
before a judge or magistrate and prior to the date
fixed for the preliminary examination pursuant
to subsections C) and (c) an indictment is re-
of this sort establishes dear standards on permissi-
ble delays in scheduling preliminary hearings. It
avoids the uncertainties that would attend a case-
by-case formulation of what constitutes unreason-
able delay in the scheduling of hearings, and is,
thus, a more desirable approach to the problem.
Perhaps the standards of the federal statute
would impose too great a burden on a local state's
attorney's office lacking manpower to meet these
requirements in all felony cases. If that should
be so, similar legislation should be passed to benefit
only those held in custody on capital offenses or,
in the alternative, those held in custody for failure
to make bond regardless of the charge. The need
for this legislation is most dearly felt by those
held on capital charges; and they, at least, should
have the relief granted by this statute.
If this statute were enacted, it would solve the
problem for which it was passed only as long as
certain guidelines of administration were adhered
to or written into the statute. First and most
important, the time limits contained in subsection
(b)n' should be viewed as the outermost limits of
delay. Delay for shorter periods should be con-
sidered the normal procedure.
Secondly, the language "only... after a finding
that extraordinary circumstances exist, and that
the delay of the preliminary hearing is indispensa-
ble to the interests of justice" should be interpreted
as strictly as possible to benefit the defendant. His
freedom is a good deal more important than the
convenience of prosecutor, policeman, or complain-
ing witness. If the prosecutor wants to deprive
the defendant of freedom for a longer period of
time than contemplated by the statute, he should
be held to a clear showing by detailed affidavits
that delay is necessary. Necessary delay should
be limited to the unavoidable absence of a specific
witness who is vital to the case and whose attend-
ance the prosecutor has made every effort to pro-
cure. 4 The judge should assume that a prosecutor
will be ready to present a case for probable cause
turned or, in appropriate cases, an information is
filed against such person in a court of the United
States.
113 Id.
114 See Hill v. Sheriff of Clark County, 85 Nev. 234,
452 P.2d 918 (1969), based on the philosophy espoused
in Ex park Ah Kee, 22 Nev. 374, 376, 40 P.2d 879,
879-80 (1895):
A prisoner's rights are to be considered and re-
spected. He is not presumed to be guilty because
he is under arrest. The presumptions are the other
way. The examination should not be delayed to
suit the convenience or personal accommodation
of the officers of the law.
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within a few days after arrest and, working from
this assumption, resolve all requests for continu-
ances accordingly.
Thirdly, any delay granted beyond the ten-day
period should be limited to two or three days at a
time.n 5 In addition, a delay should never be
granted to enable the coroner to hold an inquest.
Further, release as required in subsection (d)
n 6
should be considered as automatic; the defendant
should not be required to ask for his release in order
to obtain it.n7 A contrary requirement would make
little sense in a system in which more than half of
the defendants lack counsel n 8 Finally, for the
aforementioned reasons, the defendant should not
be required to object to a prosecution request for
delay in order to obtain his rights under the stat-
115 See, e.g., Ax. STAT. §43-608 (1964).
M1 See note 112 supra.
UT But cf. People v. Tetter, 42 111.2d 569, 250 N.E.2d
433 (1969). But see State ex rel. Haynes v. Powers, 20
Ohio St.2d 46, 254 N.E. 2d 19 (1969).
n1 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
ute.119 If judges refuse to follow the statute and
the appropriate guidelines for applying it, then the
legislature may wish to sanction dismissal of any
later indictment with prejudice. Hopefully, no
sanction so drastic will be required.
CONCLUSION
State legislatures have given defendants a right
to a preliminary hearing. However, statutory
draftings have proven so vague that this right has
been stripped from a significant class of defendants,
much to their detriment. Hopefully, courts will
correct this deplorable situation. They have a
strong position from which to work. However, if
the courts do not so act, the legislatures should
alter their statutes in order to make their will
dearer.
119 But see United States v. Cowan, 37 F.R.D. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), af'd, 396 F.2d 83 (2nd Cir. 1968);
People v. Collins, 117 Cal.App.2d 175, 255 P.2d 59
(1953); People v. Wickham, 13 Mich.App. 650, 164
N.W.2d 681 (1968).
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